We are all Tibetans now

by someone who was there

The Olympic torch relay held in Canberra on the 24th April reflected in miniature the cultural and ethnic situation of both the Tibetans and the West in general. In an act of solidarity with the Tibetan people, the National Anarchists attended the torch relay ceremony in black bloc to show our active support for their cause.

Even on the trip down to Canberra the orchestrated nature of the Chinese presence was obvious; not only were there contingents of cars making their way down to Canberra to show support for China, we saw dozens of hired coach-loads of Chinese as well.

Once we arrived in Canberra itself we saw a city inundated with marching columns of massed Chinese, decked out in red and waving the communist flag – five golden-yellow stars (each with five points) in the upper left corner. Entire street corners were filled with assembling Chinese stretching in long columns up the streets.

We gathered together and met up with up local supporters from Canberra. We went to the appointed starting point for the torch ceremonies at Reconciliation Park in front of Old Parliament House. Along the way it was already apparent that the Chinese would dwarf any show of dissent or opposition to its ‘sovereignty’ over Tibet, muting the political impact any such opposition would have.

When we arrived at Reconciliation Park the hills were swarming on both sides with Chinese nationalists. The hills were fenced off with only narrow entry points supervised by police. We gained entrance easily enough and proceeded to look for a location to set up our banner. Immediately upon unfurling our banner, ‘WE ARE ALL TIBETANS’, the police then told us, ‘This area is not for you’, and proceeded to hustle us out. We were placed outside the perimeter of the gates, but with a good view of the entire ceremony. There were so many Chinese on the hills that it looked like a scene from the Cultural Revolution, with massed crowds waving red flags. To the Tibetans and the other protestors, it was an awesome display of force.

Experienced activists know that the media’s approval or disapproval of a cause is shown by how they inflate or deflate the numbers of protestors present, depending on their support for that cause. The cause with approval gets a good number (sometime double or more the real figure of those present), the cause with disapproval gets a greatly reduced number, if it is reported at all. On this occasion however it was in the interests of the liberal media to downplay the numbers of the Chinese – to avoid Australians realizing the frightening amount of organized aliens in their midst. Contrary to media reports of there being only 10,000 Chinese supporters in Canberra on this occasion, the actually figure would have to be well over 20,000 – and it showed.

Our newly taken-up area outside the perimeter became the scene of our first confrontation with the Chinese nationalists and their ‘supporters’. Just as at APEC, the police were unable to see the importance of our masks in preserving our identities. In China, the communist State and its minions oppress dissent and signs of intellectual independence especially if it has political implications. So too in Australia we here have enemies protected by the liberal State who seek to harm us as individuals – the Australian communists. One of our members was actually forced to reveal his face to the police. This was one of the first signs of the less than professional approach taken by police on the day. Despite this, we were permitted to keep our masks on.

We set up our banner at this new location and while some of us held the banner towards the massed Chinese crowd, others handed out material to by-passers and anyone interested. We certainly stood out from the crowd, and our clear message of support for Tibet was immediately seized upon by both the media present and the Chinese nationalists swamping the hill. Almost immediately the Chinese spotted us and a regiment of a hundred or more broke off from the main host and flocked en masse towards us. Shouting, ‘One China!’, ‘Liar, Liar!’, ‘You have no face!’, as well as many incomprehensible slogans in excited Mandarin. They were extremely agitated and exulting in their numbers, their nationalist fervour (long hidden from public view) exploded into open expression. Unfortunately their nationalism is Statist, imperialistic, and supremacist in nature, and so impacts negatively on those different from them and who want to live in peace on their own and not be ruled over by those different from them.

One of our members suggested that we should step back a metre or so from the fence separating us – the confrontation was too intense and noticeable for the police not to intervene – and soon enough the police were there asking the Chinese to move back too. Some Chinese broke out into the Chinese national anthem, while others vigorously tried to block the public view of our banner. As happened to various other anti-Chinese protestors that we observed, the Chinese tried to surround and swamp our group and its banner, coming behind us and waving their large red flags over our heads provocatively. Fortunately, the police intervened and removed these provocateurs. During the day however, we observed ourselves and heard stories from others of how the Chinese masses would use this ‘swamping’ tactic to surround and cut off isolated groups of protestors from general observation, beating them with their flagpoles and fists while out of view.

Eventually a more or less uneasy stand-off occurred and we could stay in place and distribute material both here and throughout the rest of the crowd, while being constantly photographed and receiving requests for various media interviews.

During this period we also observed a Chinese flag being burned by a group of Tibetan supporters inside the fenced area. This was a brave act, because immediately scores of Chinese and police descended on the protestors. After a few brief jerks the burning flag came down. Fortunately the cameraman with us captured this incident. Also of interest were the large drums that the Chinese nationalists used in their massed chants. We observed one of these drums being wheeled past us, and the drummers walked past us with angry looks. One wonders who paid for these articles and how the Chinese were trained to use them in a synchronized fashion with the chants.

We enjoyed a good view of the opening ceremony that featured an Aboriginal dance and a smoking ceremony. Unlike at APEC, these speeches were mostly by bureaucratic officials, though one Aboriginal speaker said ominously, ‘This ceremony will help drive away the evil spirits who are here today’, presumably referring to protestors supporting the Tibetans.

In a sharp contrast to APEC, at Canberra there was a noticeable absence of any organized leftist presence. Therefore we did not see any ‘Red Blocs’ of Socialist Alternative or Resistance, nor did we see any mainstream Anarchists showing any solidarity at all with the Tibetan cause. While we did observe the occasional Australian with the Tibetans, these people were obviously not all leftists. Perhaps the leftists were wary of their ‘Red Blocs’ and communist stars being mistaken for support of communist China? In the whole day we were the only organized Western political opposition on the ground. (In a passing it should also be noted that in the entire day we did not observe a single Westerner supporting the Chinese cause).

After the ceremony closed we gave a chant of ‘Free Tibet, free Tibet!’ then headed off to new Parliament House, where a section of the torch relay was. We observed six coaches of the Chinese nationalists parked above Old Parliament House. We walked up and took a group photograph with our banner in front of New Parliament House. When we got there, for a second time I had my backpack searched and most of us were frisked. The police were probably looking more for an excuse to silence our protest and remove our presence, rather than any public safety motivation. This underlined the less professional nature of the police in comparison with the intelligence and discipline shown by the police at APEC.

All over the grass lawns of Parliament the Chinese were out in force, their presence overwhelming, and the Tibetans and their supporters were vastly outnumbered. We stayed for a while trying to gain a vantage point for the torch relay, and witnessed a number of minor scuffles between the Tibetans and the Chinese.

After a while we headed back down the hill to look for a better location to protest the torch relay. On our way down we came across a confrontation and shouting match between Tibetans and Chinese nationalists. Like their situation in Tibet and at this event itself, the Tibetans were hopelessly outnumbered, and were being swamped by the louder and more aggressive Chinese (at least when they are in overwhelming numbers). But they were fighting a losing battle, and nobly resisting to the end, while the whole situation was descending into chaos. There was a scene between two female supporters of either side, highly incensed, arguing their respective case with screaming and shouting – the Tibetan woman was in tears and the Chinese woman appeared to be mocking her. We unfurled our banner and came between the two parties, taking the Tibetan side. We started up the second chant of ‘Free Tibet!’ This time the Tibetan side which was present enthusiastically joined in unison. And the odds on that day, helped by our numbers and radical appearance, swung in the Tibetans’ favour. The Tibetans, recognizing us as their allies, grabbed our banner with us, and came to stand with their flags behind us, chanting wildly. The Chinese were taken unawares, surprised to be confronted by such a well-organized group. Only at this point did the police, who were present there from the start, decide that action was in order, and, after much backing and forthing, called on us to move on. We made our way down the hill, led by a particularly enthusiastic Tibetan, shouldering aside the now sullen Chinese, all the while continuing our chant, ‘Free Tibet!’

After a long march down with these supporters, chanting and handing our literature to bystanders we awaited the torch relay at a new location. However, due to a frequent change of route by the ACT government, the torch was not going past that location anymore. The Tibetans thanked us, and we ended our part in the proceedings for that day by walking back to our cars.

After saying goodbye to our Canberra comrades we headed back to Sydney, sighting again conveys of coaches and carloads packed with Chinese. It was a long, hard but enjoyable day of nationalist activism.

Tibet and the Lessons for the West

by Welf Herfurth

What does the Chinese occupation of Tibet, and the resistance of Tibetan nationalists against that occupation, have to do with nationalism here in the West? The answer is: a great deal. This article will use the recent events in Tibet as a starting point, and attempt to break down Left-Right thinking on the subject – that is, it will try and show that the Left does not have an exclusive monopoly on the issue. The intention of this article is to show that it is no exaggeration to say that, ‘We are all Tibetans now’.

Just as during the time of the Burmese repression of the uprising of the monks, the Left in Australia, in particular the communist groups, are trying to seize hold of the issue, and make themselves look good by associating themselves with the Tibetan uprising. They blame the Chinese heavy-handedness on ‘capitalism’ (despite the fact that the Chinese Communist Party is responsible for the occupation and repression). Likewise, the liberals are trying to portray it purely as a human rights issue. But the most important element of the Tibetan uprising is the question national identity, national self-assertion in the face of immigration. And that, of course, relates to us in the in the West: we are in the same position as the Tibetans.

The article shall conclude with an example of some of the techniques we nationalists can use to foment Tibetan-style national awakenings in our own countries. Really, we nationalists should be ashamed of ourselves: the Tibetans face a greater danger, and face worse persecution, than we do; yet, we are afraid, and, more often than not, too afraid to come out from behind the keyboard.

1. Forced immigration

The Tibetan uprising is an anti-immigrant protest. As the mainstream media reports:

But an influx of Han Chinese to Tibet, and a growing sense among Tibetans that China is irreparably altering their way of life, produced a backlash when Communist Party leaders most needed stability there, analysts say. China has also encouraged huge numbers of Chinese migrants, whose presence has diluted the Tibetan majority... The state media has tightly controlled its coverage to focus on Tibetans burning Chinese businesses or attacking and killing Chinese merchants. No mention is made of Tibetan grievances or reports that 80 or more Tibetans have died... "That is one of the biggest sources of resentment," Mr. Shakya said of the Chinese migration. He said Tibetans believed Chinese were given more opportunities for jobs, and Tibetan unemployment is high. Beijing surely noticed that the younger generation it hoped to entice was rampaging on the streets of Lhasa. [‘Simmering resentments led to Tibetan backlash’, The New York Times, March 18, 2008].

Immigration here is being used as a weapon. The Chinese, in Tibet, have tried to change the ethnic composition of the Tibetan population by forcing as many immigrants – from China – upon them as possible. Another conspicuous example of the same technique is in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Israel, for decades, has been trying to change the ethnic composition of the Territories by settling as many Jewish-Israelis there (I use the word ‘Jewish-Israelis’ as opposed to ‘Israeli’, because there are one million Arab-Israelis in Israel, and they are not the ones being settled). Recently, the Israeli government announced that it would build 40,000 units (!) for ‘young Jewish couples’ in occupied East Jerusalem, all this while the “Peace Process” is meant to be going on.

(In fact, the State of Israel itself got started using this method – of deliberate ‘over-immigration’. Jewish-Europeans, mainly from Poland and Eastern Europe, settled in Palestine in the hundreds of thousands before, during and after the Second World War. By 1948, the Jewish-Europeans had waged a successful guerrilla war against the British, forcing them out, and had built up enough numbers (and gathered enough material support, i.e., arms from Josef Stalin) to form an army and wage a successful conventional war against Palestine’s Arab neighbours. The remaining parts of Palestine was partitioned between Jordan and Egypt, and 800,000 indigenous Palestinians were ethnically cleansed. The new State of Israel was formed, and received diplomatic recognition from both the USSR and USA within hours. The rest, as they say, is history).

Now, the strategy of forced immigration is extremely effective. Why? Because the presence of large numbers of immigrants becomes a fait accompli: it takes cruel, not to say inhuman, measures to get rid of those immigrants once they have arrived, and once they have lived there for a few generations. The Palestinians in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, resented, naturally, the huge influx of Jewish-Europeans. But that resentment – which often exploded into riots and acts of violence against the immigrants (similar to what we are seeing in Tibet) – was met with cries of “racism” and “anti-Semitism”, even “Nazism”. It is notable, too, that the Jewish-European immigrants, and the Jewish Diaspora outside Palestine, exploited Palestinian acts of violence against the immigrants to the hilt, using the incidents in their propaganda war against the Palestinians, just as the Chinese government today is using footage of Tibetan violence (against Han Chinese immigrants) in its propaganda war.

Now, we in the West are in the same boat as the Tibetans and Palestinians. We have not reached the crisis point, but we are getting there. Britain has received hundreds of thousands of new immigrants, following the election of Tony Blair in 1997 (and this is on top of the immigrants from the Caribbean and the Sub-Continent, who arrived in huge waves in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s). America’s Hispanic population has reached 34 million, and threatens to eclipse the Afro-American population in size (10% of the Mexican population has departed for America). Australia has received tens of thousands of Indian and Chinese immigrants in recent years, under the “conservative” government of John Howard, and at this rate, Sydney will be an all-Chinese city in a few decades, Melbourne all-Indian. One could go on, citing the huge numbers of immigrants into Germany, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and other Western countries.

Because these immigrants have put down roots, it will be a difficult – some pessimists say, impossible – job to remove them. This is not because of “assimilation”: from my own experience, the non-European immigrants to Australia have not “assimilated” (i.e., magically become Australian in all respects except the racial) even after living here for decades; likewise for the 3 million strong Turkish immigration population in Germany. No, repatriation is difficult because of the dislocation and suffering it inevitably entails. The Chinese government, and the Israeli government, know that. Woe betides the Palestinians if they ever became militarily strong enough to force the Jewish-European settlers in the Territories to leave. The Jewish-Israeli religious fundamentalist settlers in Gaza, for example, put on an Oscar-winning performance of grief and suffering (with some sympathetic media coverage) when they were forced to leave by their own government. And now the Chinese government is stirring up nationalistic fervour among its own people over violence committed against the Han Chinese in Tibet. One can imagine, then, the reaction from the Western mainstream media – which is relentlessly pro-immigrant – were a populist politician to be elected in the Netherlands or Britain and start deporting immigrants who had been there for decades. The media would, in its reporting, would give maximum coverage to the suffering and stress of the deported immigrant families (while overlooking, of course, the suffering and stress decades of immigration has caused to the indigenous Dutch and British populations).

The question is, from a demographic point of view, can the Chinese, and the Jewish-Israelis, win? Can they depopulate Tibet, or the Occupied Territories, through immigration? The answer is, I think, no, at least in the case of the Palestinians. There are 3.6 million Palestinians crammed into the Territories: even tens of thousands of new Jewish-Israeli settlers will not make much of a dent.

As for the West: pessimistic white nationalists seem to believe that the European population in the US, Britain, Sweden, Germany, France, are a dying race – that they are in the same position as some Amazonian Indian tribe, who suffer from poor health, low life-expectancy and a low ‘replacement rate’ (i.e., births replacing deaths). On the contrary, the Western populations are the healthiest and the most long-lived in the world. They will not disappear from the US, or Germany, any time soon. But – and here is the but – they will disappear, in large numbers, from the areas the immigrants are migrating to. The phenomena of ‘white flight’ are very real, and we are seeing it in action all over the West today. In effect, this is an ethnic-cleansing of the cities (which is where almost all immigrants go). Over time, the numerous numbers of indigenous British, French, and Germans will be pushed out of their capital cities, and replaced by immigrants. The population of the Western nations, overall, will increase, to unsustainable levels – unsustainable economically and environmentally.

The question is - why is this going on? What aggrieves people about the Tibetan, and the Palestinian, situation is the malign intent of the occupiers: China and the Jewish-Israelis are prepared to use force, and immigration, in an attempt to destroy the Tibetans and Palestinians respectively, on every level – culturally, economically, and, in the case of the Tibetans, even environmentally. So what of the governments in the West - do they possess that same intent? Yes, they do. But the strange thing is that the pro-immigration politicians – the Merkels, Browns, Bushes, Rudds – are of European descent, and yet, at the same time, do not seem to like their own people very much. At least, they do not want people of European descent to be in the majority. Why is that?

One of the answers is, simply, that it is a generational thing. The parents of the Bush-Brown-Rudd generation were racialist (without thinking about it too much) and opposed Third World immigration (and, in America, desegregation). That generation fought a long war against their parents – a political and cultural war – against race-based immigration policies, against Apartheid in South Africa, against segregation in the American Deep South. They won that war, or at least, they are in power (and their parents’ generation are not any more). And, in their minds, they are still fighting the same struggle today. They dislike their parent’s generation and its values so much that they are willing to see their countries disappear under a flood of non-European immigration.

Which, in fact, is a cause for hope: if the next generation of leaders is more nationalist than the Browns and Bushes, we will see a reduction of immigration and a rejection of the state-sanctioned ideology of multiculturalism. In the meantime, we must contend with the fact that our present leaders do not really care about the indigenous populations of Britain, Germany, France, Sweden, and the European populations of Australia, New Zealand, the USA, Canada. ‘Anglo’ or ‘European’ culture is boring, too ‘white bread’: we need ‘diversity’, more and more immigrants, and anyone who voices their objections to immigration is a racist and deserves to go to jail. That is the world view of the ‘Generation of 1968’, which now rules the entire Western world – through the parliaments, the universities, the opinion columns of the newspapers, through television drama, through film.

2. The ethics of occupation

As anyone familiar with the left-wing scene in Australia knows, the communist groups here are Trotskyist: they have a fanatical devotion to the ideas of Trotsky, no matter how outdated Trotsky’s positions have become (after all, he died in 1941). Now, these same communists in Australia (and elsewhere in the West) oppose the Chinese occupation of Tibet on communist, left-wing and Trotskyist principles. But they are hypocritical to do so. After all, Russia, in the Leninist-Trotskyist period, incorporated the 14 or so other countries which made up the Soviet Union by force, and then went on to invade the Baltic States and Poland (where they were thrashed by the Germans and the Poles respectively).

Likewise, Chinese communism appears to be anti-imperialist, and, historically, has lent its support to ‘anti-imperialist’ struggles all over the world. The ideology of Chinese communism gives the appearance of being, in principle, opposed to the likes of the Tibetan occupation. But this is only a surface impression. Chinese communism has never opposed imperialism, racism, nationalism on principle: it has only opposed the imperialism, racism and nationalism directed against it – Chinese nationalism, racism and nationalism is fine. This is something that self-proclaimed Maoists in the West have never understood. (Likewise, Vietnamese and Cambodian communism was deeply nationalistic and racialist, while being fervently anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist – i.e., opposed to Western colonialism and Western imperialism).

In the West, there was another form of radical, left-wing socialism which was opposed to foreign imperialism and colonialism while being, at the same time, nationalistic, racialist: German National Socialism. It may surprise people to be reminded that Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf’ was an anti-occupation text (Now before all my friends from the ANTIFA jumping up and down and call me a NAZI because I dare to mention ‘Mein Kampf, please keep in mind that by just quoting the man doesn’t mean that I agree with the author of the book 100%. Hey, I quoted Mao and Che before and you didn’t call me a Commie as yet). The ire of the book is not directed, on the whole, against Jewish-Europeans, but against the French, who occupied, at the time of writing, the Saar, the Ruhr and the Rhineland. The French used the traditional techniques of occupying powers – suppression of language, culture and existing customs, and the encouragement of local separatist tendencies – as a means of continuing their war after the war against the Germans. Hitler, in ‘Mein Kampf’, champions the rights of an oppressed people – the Germans – against a much stronger occupier. But, like Mao and Lenin, he never took up anti-imperialism as a general principle, and of course, supported the dissolution of Poland, in the 19th century, into Germany and Russia (with all the accompanying suppression of Polish customs, language and culture).

That is how it is in politics: the right or wrong of the matter is relative, depending on one’s perspective. What matters is: do you, or do you not, support the occupation of your own country?

Now, Western Europe has been under Allied – American and British – occupation for sixty years. This is a fact. Even though the US military has wound down its military presence in Germany (because of the end of the Cold War, and requirements in Iraq), it still occupies Germany non-militarily. The same can be said of France, the Netherlands, Italy and the other countries which came under the Allied yoke.

How does America occupy these countries? For starters, the German constitution was written for Germany by the occupiers, and expressly forbids, as we know, any expression of German nationalism or independent foreign policy. And then there is the cultural occupation: the endless flood of anti-German books, films, news coverage, court cases (seeking redress for real or alleged German atrocities committed during WWII), plays, comic books, which seek to “educate” Germans as to how bad they are, and how the American (and Russian) occupiers “saved” them from themselves. Then there is the ritual obeisance paid to the Americans by all German politicians of all mainstream liberal-democratic parties.

The situation is much the same elsewhere in Western Europe – in France, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain. Indeed, each of these countries is “judged”, by the mainstream media, the intellectuals and the politicians, on the basis of its conduct during the war: Italy and Spain are “bad” because of Mussolini and Franco; France is highly suspect because of its support for Vichy (and besides which, it threw in the towel too easily after the German invasion of 1940); and so it goes, even though the war ended sixty years ago. This is all the product of an American occupation which influences the way Europeans see themselves: one could call it an occupation of the mind.

And it was all made possible by an American military occupation. Even in the case of the British, the arrival of millions of American troops to the United Kingdom in the Second World War, for preparation for the Normandy invasion, represented an occupation of sorts: their presence there dissuaded the British from cutting a deal with Germany at this point in the war. Francis Parker Yockey, in ‘The Enemy of Europe’ (in the chapter, ‘Three Aspects of the War’), writes that ‘England’s total war-effort was brought ever more under the direction of the Washington regime, and England, likewise its remaining overseas possessions, was occupied by American troops.

Thereby the Washington regime wanted to ensure that England would not attempt to bail out of the War...’.

The problem all this ancient history (and WWII is becoming ancient history) presents for nationalists is simple: once you, as a nationalist, start talking about immigration, and how something needs to be done about the non-European migrants in one’s country (e.g., they need to be repatriated), some liberal or communist will call you “Nazi” or “fascist”. This is despite the fact that, until the 1970s, neither Germany nor Italy suffered from an immigration problem: both countries were net exporters, not importers, of people, until the period of post-war economic prosperity. But the foes of nationalism are not given to logic and consistency, and so the burden of war “guilt”, in Germany, Italy and other Western European countries, weighs heavily, dissuading any nationalist policy of repatriation. This mentality even affects countries which fought against Germany in the war. In a recent news story in the British press, it was revealed that the British government sent mixed-race children (the products of couplings between Afro-American servicemen and indigenous British women) abroad, despite the misgivings that the plan was somewhat “Nazi”.

There is, for the Western nationalist, no way of getting around it. The American occupation of the European mind has very real consequences for nationalists.

The Tibetans (fortunately for them) are not burdened with years of Allied brainwashing (only years of Chinese brainwashing, which seems to have been comparatively less effective). And, to their credit, have made the political choice: they are acting. No doubt there are many Tibetans who do not want to make waves, and want to lead politically passive lives; but there are others who have had enough, and are taking a stand against a superior military and political power, for nationalism and against immigration. This is while we, in the West, who are facing a graver demographic and cultural problem in the long term, prefer to sit back and play with the X-Box.

3. The solution: get rid of fear

Many people in the West agree with the nationalists that immigration is a problem: and many people who are doctors, lawyers, academics, journalists, would speak out against it if they were not afraid. Who is it that scares them? In Australia, it is not multi-culti fanatics in the Labor and Liberal parties; or journalists like Gerard Henderson and Phillip Adams (who are on the mainstream Right and Left respectively, and who both adore immigration). No, it is the communists. Sooner or later in politics, one has to go out, in public, and meet people in one’s community, in order to drum up support. Nationalists need to do that: but they are afraid. Most of the nationalists I know spend half of their lives in fear – fear that a communist will, somewhere, take a photo of them and publish it on a website; or that a communist gang will beat them up; or that communists will disrupt a meeting, a march or a rally. In response to that fear, these nationalists tend to operate like a clandestine secret society – like the Freemasons. Meetings are held in secret, as are conferences with other nationalists from interstate. False names are used when meeting other people and (if things keep going down the Freemason-esque path) secret handshakes will be used as well.

The main problem with this approach is that nationalism is not a conspiratorial movement: it can only survive with the oxygen of publicity. Furthermore, nationalists need to build up their confidence in themselves and their ideas. Third, they need to go out and meet the people. So how can nationalists start doing all this?

Communist groups use posters, fliers and brochures to advertise events: usually rallies or, more often, meetings and educational nights at a function room at a local bar. At these meetings and educational nights, communists deliver speeches, or hold a film night, where they show a DVD of Lenin and Trotsky, or Chavez, or Castro, or the Colombian FARC rebels, or whoever. The communists are, in my experience, completely brazen: they will even include the names and mobile names of the organisers down the bottom of the poster. Communists do not live in fear like we nationalists do: despite their “rebellion” against “capitalism”, the capitalists (who, according to the Marxist analysis, control the entire Australian political system) do not care very much – at least, not enough to try and phone the bar owner to close down the event, or send some capitalist thugs around to beat the communists up.

What we nationalists need to do is follow the same strategy of booking function rooms and advertising them heavily. The difference is that we shall design posters, fliers, etc., and fill them with “Left” images and slogans (avoiding, of course, the hammer and sickle), supporting traditionally “Left” causes (the occupation of Iraq, Palestine, Tibet, for example) and, furthermore, we shall post our advertising in the ‘Red’ quarters of cities like Sydney and Melbourne – that is, the universities, and the bohemian/student parts of town which (in my experience) are targeted heavily by communists in their recruitment drives. All of this is intended to provoke the communists: and it would be a masterful provocation to hold a nationalist educational seminar/DVD night at a function room right in the heart of Red Sydney or Melbourne, so to speak.

What would the communist reaction be? Firstly, shock and disbelief. Secondly, panic: they would tell each other, ‘It’s a capitalist plot – these people aren’t real left-wingers/socialists, they’re Nazis, provocateurs working for the government... Make sure that no-one is fooled by their imposture. We don’t want young, naive student-types to be sucked in...’. Third, the inevitable reaction: ‘Fascist/racist/Nazi scum out. Smash fascism!’. Communists will turn up to the meeting, with the intention of taking as many pictures as possible, and to break it up, through heckling, and then force.

And this is what we have prepared for. Firstly, we shall have a reasonable number of tough, courageous, and physically intimidating nationalists acting as stewards standing by, ready to pounce at the first sign of a Red attack. Secondly, we shall bar all cameras at the door – and anyone caught taking pictures will be thrown out of the meeting and have their camera confiscated before they can flee. (There is always a risk that a communist may take pictures with a hidden camera, but that is a chance we will have to take).

Communists can be expected to exert maximum pressure on the owner of the function room to ‘not rent it to Neo-Nazis’. In response to that, we shall tell the owner: ‘That’s nonsense: we are a left-wing, socialist group, and these commies who are trying to close down our meeting are from a rival left-wing faction’. And, if the owner doesn’t believe that we are left-wing, we shall show him our Left-seeming posters and stickers. ‘Does this look Neo-Nazi to you?’.

Inevitably, the communists will win some of the time, and force us to relocate to a new venue. Possibly, we shall be in a situation where we shall never be able to use the same venue twice. Again, this is another chance we have to take.

The advantage of public meetings is just that: they are public, and interested members of the community are able to attend. Some independent-minded younger people may have heard rumours that the nationalist meetings are “fascist” and “Nazi”, and will come to see what all this “fascism” and “racism” is about, and be surprised to learn that we nationalists do have some good and reasonable ideas. Over time, we will be able to attract more of those kinds of people to nationalism. What is more, we will get into the habit of communicating our ideas to people outside the usual small clique of nationalists.

Some nationalists may reproach me here for ‘giving the game away’, for revealing too much of our plans. My response to that is, firstly, the communist has a complete contempt for our intelligence and abilities; he or she certainly won’t have bothered to read this article in full, much less take it seriously. Secondly, the worst thing the communists can do to us is ignore us – to let us hold our meetings and DVD presentations in their Red neighbourhoods.

Nationalism will wither and die without the oxygen of publicity. But a communist ignoring a so-called “fascist”, “racist” and “Nazi” presence in his midst? Impossible: such a thing has never occurred in the history of communism. Communists can always be trusted to use the same tactics, and react the same way, over and over. They are, in essence, machines, their brains computers programmed with the dogmas of Lenin, Trotsky, Marx and Engels.

The essential thing is that once the communists see that we are not discouraged by their attacks on our meetings, that we can stand up to them, physically if need be, and that we are not afraid – then they will give up. They will simply stop trying. Nationalism will be accepted as another fact of political life.

4. In conclusion

Now, I admit that this seems quite a leap – going from talking about the Tibetan struggle to communism. But the fact of the matter is that our situation in the West has not reached critical mass in the way that the Tibetan has: indigenous French, British, Germans, Swedes, Dutch, and European Australians, Americans and Canadians are not rioting in the street, smashing immigrant shop windows, overturning cars, setting fires, attacking policemen. In order to oppose immigration and globalisation, we in the West need to organise politically. And, as soon as one does that, one comes up against the same problem again and again: organised Red bullying which prevents nationalists from exercising their political rights – communist groups which (to make no bones about it) use terror to achieve their objectives. It is not the liberal establishment – the politicians, academics, trade unions, church groups – which are opposing us, using threats, intimidation and force: it is the communists. (Perhaps, if our government was communist – like the one in China – we would be facing rows of policemen, beating our brains out with truncheons and shooting us).

What is holding us back is fear: a fear, which, to my mind, is unreasonable. Yes, there is a danger that we may get photographed, and have our names and addresses posted on the Internet. But that is not the worst that can happen. For one thing, the communists of today are not like those of the thirties: if they come to our meetings to heckle us, and try and break them up, they will not (like in Stalin’s day) be bringing coshes, razors, knuckle-dusters, vials of acid and even handguns. We do not risk injury to life and limb. Extreme politics, of any kind, has always carried grave danger to its exponents in the past. Nothing deterred the anarchist Emma Goldman from touring the world and making speeches in halls (to packed capacity), despite the tremendous repression she faced: one has to admire her courage in the face of adversity, an adversity greater than that faced by any Western nationalist c. 2008. So what if a photo of one of us appears on an Antifa website? So what if a newspaper, in some article buried in page 42, calls one of us a “Nazi”, a “racist” and a “fascist”? Compared to Emma Goldman, or any Brownshirt or Blackshirt from the 1920s and 1930s, we nationalists have it easy. And compared to the Tibetans, or Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC in the former Rhodesia, we have it easy.

No doubt, in some charter of human rights (guaranteed by international law), it says that indigenous populations have the right to resist colonisation and immigration. So the Tibetans are justified – legally – in doing what they do. So are we in the West: after all, we are being colonised: the massive flood of immigration in Europe, North America, Australia, is neo-colonialism.

The problem is that, living in a liberal democracy, we have come to expect that certain rights are a given. In truth, they are not: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and the right of national, ethnic self-determination for all peoples, are rights that have to be fought for, that have to be won by the fist. No-one recognises your rights unless you are prepared to fight for them.

White nationalists, on the white nationalist message boards, like to praise the white race for its courage, its daring. But the truth is that we Celts, Teutons, Latins, Norse, Anglo-Saxons have not displayed that supposed courage for a long time. Indeed, the very thought of speaking nationalist, and racialist, ideas in public frightens us.

In that regard, I want nationalists here in the West to look at the Tibetan example and feel shame. Here are a people (derided as ‘yellows’ by our supposedly brave, stalwart white nationalists) who are defending their heritage, their culture, their uniqueness, in the face of awesome repression. They are sticking up for themselves, whereas we are not.

Nationalists in the West need to find the courage in themselves to emulate the Tibetans in their courage, their determination, their sacrifice.

*Welf Herfurth is a political activist who lives in Sydney / Australia. He was born and raised in Germany. He can be contacted on herfurth@iinet.net.au

EXTINGUISH THE FLAME

As part of showing our solidarity with the Tibetan struggle, we call on all people to be part of the demonstrations against the torch relay in Canberra on the 24th of April. The National Anarchists will be attending in force. For further information, please contact the New Right in your state. For security reasons we can’t give out too much information, but we can tell you that we will have a lot of fun.

STATEMENT OF NEW RIGHT ON NATIONAL-ANARCHISM AND AUSTRALIAN NATIONALISM

by the New Right Australia New Zealand Committee


1. Introduction

This statement is in response to a recent article on the New Right Australia/New Zealand, “An error in New Right Australia/New Zealand: is there an effective acceptance of multiculturalism and multiracialism in Australia?” by Dr James Saleam, one of Australia’s leading nationalist intellectuals. (The article can be found at: home.alphalink.com.au/~radnat/defendnationalism/defend12.html
Readers of this article are urged to read Dr Saleam’s article first.

Normally, the New Right does not respond to comments, criticisms, attacks or anything of that kind, on the Internet or anywhere else: the New Right is not a reactive organisation. But in this case, it was decided that an exception would be made, because nationalists and people who subscribe to other ideologies may be asking the same questions as Dr Saleam.

In his article, Dr Saleam has asked for a clarification from New Right on several points – the main one being (as the title of his article suggests) whether or not New Right accepts the existing government policy of unrestricted, non-European immigration into Australia and the ideology of multiculturalism. Which is not to say that Dr Saleam has the right, prima facie, to demand such clarifications. The New Right represents metapolitics – which means looking at political problems from different perspectives, and unconventional perspectives at that. It is not Australian nationalism, and does not view every political problem through the prism of Australian nationhood. In other words, we in the New Right are not accountable, in any way, to Australian nationalism.

To return to Dr Saleam’s article: his questions are: does the New Right accept multiculturalism and multiracialism as a historical inevitability? Does New Right advocate moves to lessen the numbers of immigrants arriving into this country (through government action) and a policy of repatriating immigrants already here? Dr Saleam notes that New Right seems to give the impression that nothing can be done, via government action, to prevent immigration; and that, so long as the immigrant communities are separate from the Anglo-European, nothing should be done – the two separate communities can live side by side, in peace.

As well as that, in Dr Saleam’s view, it seems that New Right endorses the notion that, over time, the Australian nation, and the Australian State itself, shall disappear, becoming a decentralised patchwork of ethnic communities (whether immigrant or Anglo-European). This doctrine Dr Saleam finds objectionable: and a good many other nationalists in Australia likewise will have problems with it.

It should be noted here, from the outset, that the New Right is not a monolithic organisation: it is comprised of many people of many different views. Some are National-Anarchists; others, Christians; others, white nationalists (of the David Lane/David Duke/William Pierce school); others, sympathisers with traditional Australian nationalism (e.g., Jack Lang, William Lane). Some come from skinhead backgrounds, others from conservative political backgrounds (i.e., have traditionally voted Liberal), others from the Left.

Secondly, New Right does not have a communist, or corporate, or fascist, or in any way dictatorial, system of imposing a party line on its members. In a Marxist-Leninist communist party, the leadership makes a decision on what the communist party position is on such-and-such a topic (China, Russia, gays, immigration, abortion) and then uses discipline to make sure that every member adheres to that position, in statements to the media, and in party publications. In contrast to this, New Right has a decentralised structure, and the metapolitical approach mentioned earlier. Some members may make statements, and pursue certain lines of thought, at nationalist conferences, which are, for instance, National-Anarchist; as well as that, some New Right propaganda and display material (which has been reproduced on the Internet) such as posters, banners and the like, may use National-Anarchist slogans and symbols. Whether or not the New Right member chooses to use National-Anarchist symbols, or animal liberationist symbols, or white nationalist symbols, when producing New Right material, is up to him or her. The same applies when that member is making a presentation to other nationalists and other political groups. There is no ‘head office’ for New Right which censures individual activists for ‘going against the party line’.

Third, in Australia, immigration levels are higher than ever before, and Australian identity is gradually being eroded, not only because of immigration, but because of American and globalist pop culture. Nationalism in Australia has, so far, failed to counteract this – and failed completely. One could say that nationalism in Australia has been failing for thirty years. It has no influence whatsoever on Australian political, or for that matter, intellectual, life. That is why the New Right Australia New Zealand is looking for a different approach.

Fourth, New Right, as Dr Saleam points out, is a new movement, a developing movement: so many of the ‘concrete’ positions, or ‘core values’, are still being formulated. That is because the New Right is a response to thirty years failure of Australian nationalism, and, as stated before, is looking for new solutions.

Now, a critic may say in response to this: ‘It sounds as though you in the New Right are all over the place: what exactly do you all believe in? And what are your positions on the questions Dr Saleam has raised in his article?’. Here we will attempt to answer both of these questions.

2. The Nouvelle Droit

The ideas of New Right have their roots in the European Nouvelle Droite, an informal, Europe-based intellectual grouping. I can find no better capsule summary of their ideas than that found in the publication by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, the “Annual Report 2005 on the Protection of the Constitution”. I shall reproduce it here:

Neue Rechte (New Right)

The New Right first emerged as a movement among French
intellectuals in the 1970s which sought to raise the intellectual
standards within the right-wing extremist camp. Among other things it
invokes anti-democratic thought propagated by representatives of the
“conservative revolution”, a political current in the Weimar Republic.
The activists of the New Right want to abolish or at least impair the
democratic constitutional state. To this effect, they try to gain influence
within the area of cultural politics in order to finally delegitimise the
democratic constitutional state and radically change the political
system [...]

This is a perfect description of the Nouvelle Droit’s methods and intentions – and New Right Australia/New Zealand’s.

The second core element of Nouvelle Droit ideology comes from the thinking of Alain de Benoist, one of the founders of the Nouvelle Droit.

De Benoist’s work has a vast range. But one of his main ideas is that of the organic community: a homogenous organism, which has a life of its own, has developed naturally, over a period of time, without outside pressure, and which tends to segregate itself from other communities, maintaining its own homogeneity, and keeping its own customs and traditions separate from the others. State-sanctioned multiracialism attempts to break up such communities by force, in order to ‘integrate’ them with other ethnic communities in the same country. An example of this is America in the 1950s, where President Eisenhower ordered the National Guard to force integration on Southern schools, against the wishes of the Anglo-American majority. (The Anglo-American opponents of integration advocated ‘State’s rights’ - that is, the rights of the Southern states to resist integration and desegregation forced upon them by a centralised federal US government which did not share their concerns).

De Benoist is an instinctive federalist: that is, he believes that the ethnically-homogenous communities should be autonomous (but not independent from and separate) in relation to the State, that they have a right to maintain their own homogeneity and customs, and that the ideal State should be as decentralised as possible (e.g., giving those individual states (in a federal structure, like in Australia or the United States) or communities as much leeway as possible in ordering their own affairs. De Benoist is against nationalism, or nation-statism, to the extent that it imposes a phoney nationalism on its population which erases the real and existing ethnic (and racial) differences. De Benoist would deplore the communist government of the former Yugoslavia for using force to impose a phoney ‘Yugoslav’ national identity on its Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Slovenian inhabitants where no such ‘Yugoslav’ identity had previously existed.

De Benoist’s ideas have to be understood in a French political context. There is no reason, however, why De Benoist’s model cannot be transposed to other countries – namely, Australia, or the US.

The question is, however: does de Benoist oppose repatriation through State action? Does he advocate anarchism? Are his ideas (and those of the Nouvelle Droit) National-Anarchism?

There is no clear answer to the first question, whether or not de Benoist supports repatriation. He has distanced himself in the past from Jean-Marie Le Pen and the FN (which supports repatriation), but his views on that subject in particular are not exactly clear. He avoids it, so far as we can tell, in his writings.

As to whether or not he advocates anarchism, or the abolition of the nation-state itself, the answer is no. In his essay, “Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: A sociological view of the decay of modern society” (1994), de Benoist writes:

Nationalists are proponents of holism. Nationalists see the individual as a kinsman, sustained by the people and community. which nurtures and protects him, and with which he is proud to identify. The individual's actions represent an act of participation in the life of his people, and freedom of action is very real because, sharing in the values of his associates, the individual will seldom seek to threaten the basic values of the community with which he identifies. Societies which lack this basic sense of national unity are inherently prone to suffer from repeated situations wherein the opposing values of its egotistical members conflict with each other.

Furthermore, proponents of nationhood contend that a society or a people can survive only when: a) they remain aware of their cultural and historical origins; b) when they can assemble around a mediator, be it individual, or symbolic, who is capable of reassembling their energies and catalyzing their will to have a destiny; c) when they can retain the courage to designate their enemy. None of these conditions have been realized in societies that put economic gain above all other values, and which consequently: a) dissolve historical memories; b) extinguish the sublime and eliminate subliminal ideals; c) assume that it is possible not to have enemies [...]

Now, such remarks by de Benoist are not exactly ‘statist’ or ‘fascist’: but they are not exactly anarchist either.

Where does the New Right Australia/NZ stand in relation to de Benoist? In broad agreement. But most nationalists, and Dr Saleam himself, would agree with the de Benoist doctrine as stated here. It is hard to imagine that a real controversy could exist, in the nationalist movement in Australia and outside, about de Benoist’s ideas: most nationalists agree with the basic principles.

3. National-Anarchism and its relation to New Right

On the other hand, National-Anarchism is a controversial topic among nationalists, and Left organisations. So we should make clear, here, what National-Anarchism is and what its relation to New Right is.

National-Anarchism, as conceived by Troy Southgate, believes in what Marx called ‘The withering away of the State’: that, following a series of economic (owing to the instability of the capitalist economic system) and even ecological crises, that Western nation-states will break up into separate, ethnically homogenous communities, concentrated in the rural and semi-rural areas. These communities shall be small, and practice self-sufficiency. Mr Southgate’s vision is not so different from that of the ‘eco-primitivists’, Richard Hunt and the ‘green anarchists’: he does not repudiate 21st century technology, but he does believe that a system where people live in small communities away from the overcrowded cities, with plenty of arable land, in a country with a much-reduced population, is desirable. In Mr Southgate’s new anarchist order, the State shall cease to exist, and possibly the capitalist economy will be replaced by a system of barter. As for defence functions, the small town militia will replace conventional military forces.

In practical terms, National-Anarchism means a cessation of party politics, electoral politics, ballot-box politics: no participation in the life of the State or the liberal democratic system which forms the basis of the State in the Western world today. The best thing a nationalist can do is isolate himself and his family from multiculturalism and multiracialism as it exists in Western societies (and makes itself felt through the Western media and popular culture). For that reason, Mr Southgate advocates home schooling (to shield one’s children from forced ‘integration’ in schools), better education, the protection of the family unit, and the consumption of little of the Western mass media as possible.

Mr Southgate believes that the nationalists who pursue a ‘white revolution’, who engage in political activism designed to stir up the masses against multiculturalism and immigration, who participate in party-politics (e.g., join the British BNP and the French FN) and who seek to bring about a government policy of repatriation, are chasing fool’s gold. His view is that the non-indigenous communities in Britain are thoroughly entrenched, through having been there for so long (some of the immigrant communities first appeared in the 1950s) and through racial mixing with the indigenous British population. So repatriation is virtually impossible, and it is unrealistic of British nationalists to believe that somehow the British people will ‘rise up’ and repatriate those immigrants, with all the dislocation and turmoil that would entail. The only solution is to create a ‘parallel society’, here and now, that is, work to build an ethnically-homogenous community – or rather, improve relations between the disparate and separate individuals who make up that community, and encourage them to think of themselves as a community, and not individuals – which will exist in total isolation from the State, and from political parties.

Where does the New Right Australia/New Zealand stand in relation National-Anarchism?

Firstly, it is not a National-Anarchist group, but some members are National-Anarchists. As for the relation between National-Anarchist theory and New Right ideology, it was stated (erroneously) in the article, “The New Right Manifesto” (published on the Internet in 2007) that the National-Anarchists represent the application of de Benoist’s ideas, that ‘New Right is the theory, National-Anarchism the practice’. This was debatable, as the reader can see for himself when comparing the two doctrines (Nouvelle Droit and National-Anarchism) as expounded here. Many of the street activists for the New Right are not National-Anarchists (many of them are not Christians, either, or animal liberationists).

The fact that Mr Southgate is one of the organisers of the annual New Right conference in Britain may seem to give the impression that National-Anarchism and the New Right (in Britain, or Australia) are the one and the same thing, or at least closely tied together. So may the fact that members of the New Right Australia/New Zealand have given lectures on National-Anarchist ideas at nationalist events, or given sympathetic expositions of National-Anarchism to other nationalists in private conversations or in correspondences.

To clear up these misunderstandings: Mr Southgate does maintain an interest in the ideas of the Nouvelle Droit, and has contributed articles to the British New Right’s magazine, “Scorpion”. But Mr Southgate is also interested in many theories which are not related to New Right/Nouvelle Droit ideas: for instance, Evolian Traditionalism, and Wodenism. He is also very much interested in classical anarchist thinkers such as Bakunin and Kropotkin.

Secondly, as stated before, New Right Australia/New Zealand is not a monolithic organisation. If someone does detect an inconsistency between a speech made by a member of the New Right, and an article on one of the New Right websites, so be it.

Some confusion may arise in nationalist observers about the issue (the precise relation of National-Anarchism to the New Right) simply because the New Right is a developing organisation. The New Right Australia/New Zealand was originally conceived (by Mr Welf Herfurth) as a nationalist think-tank like the ‘Dresdner School’, the German nationalist think-tank which is related to the NPD. As time progressed, the New Right Australia/New Zealand expanded into street activism (while still maintaining its original function as a think-tank). Probably, in organisational terms, it is necessary to split the New Right into two separate departments – a think-tank and a street activist wing. Because a few of the prominent New Right activists do believe in National-Anarchism to a greater or lesser degree, one proposal has been that the National-Anarchists could be the street arm of the New Right. This would not be feasible, because National-Anarchist ideology is not totally commensurate with the intellectual positions of the New Right or the aims of the New Right over the long term. But there is a need – organisationally – for a street activist wing, and perhaps, in the (very) distant future, a political party as well. The problem is really an internal organisational one, which will be addressed in due course, not uncommon to rapidly growing political groups.

4. New Right and repatriation

So what is the New Right position on repatriation, and does it believe that repatriation can be achieved through the State, e.g., through a State controlled by a nationalist party? Does it believe that political activity, and elections, and parties, are futile? Is the isolationism, and ‘parallel society-ism’, of National-Anarchism, the answer?

Most nationalists in Australia want to reclaim Australia’s unique Anglo-European identity by a) putting a halt to the current immigration policy, which aims at bringing as many non-European migrants as possible to our shores, to stay, permanently; and b) by encouraging the non-European immigrants already living here (some for thirty years) to return to their homelands. New Right Australia/New Zealand agrees with these aims.

It should be pointed out that the above objectives can be reached by community action, as opposed to State action: one only has to look at the recent events in Tibet, where the Tibetan population has revolted against Beijing’s policy mass Han-Chinese immigration into Tibet; or in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, where the Palestinians have revolted against Israeli policy of settlement-building for Jewish Israelis on Palestinian land; or Kenya, which has seen intertribal, inter-communal unrest, and the expulsion of ethnic communities from villages.
However, probably the best, most efficient (and most humane) way of achieving the two objectives is politically, through the State. The Australian State can put forward legislation halting non-European immigration immediately, and then use its financial resources to provide the inducement for non-European immigrants to resettle in their homelands.

In the conventional scenario, posited by nationalist groups in Australia and elsewhere, nationalists only need to form a party, get elected to office, and then start carrying out the two policies mentioned above. Theoretically, nationalists are not restricted to that option: there is always the possibility of the seizure of power through a coup d’état, or a protracted period of insurgency. In Western liberal democracies, such options are not usually considered, and in some Western countries (such as Australia) it is illegal even to contemplate, on paper, such possibilities.

Where does New Right stand? A party with mass-based, popular support, winning power through an election is the best way – and the only legal way. Perhaps it is not feasible, not realistic: perhaps any win, by nationalists in Australia, is not possible, given the obstacles faced (including the preferential voting system). But, in any case, a party (and the electoral process) is really part the way of representing Anglo-Europeans across the entire nation.
New Right differs from Australian nationalists insofar as that it makes a thoroughgoing intellectual and sociological analyses of what it is that makes some nationalist parties win and others fail. It has held the NPD up as an example because it believes that the NPD, with its ‘three pillars’ strategy, is going about electioneering the right way. New Right has stated, many times, that the essential thing for a nationalist party to do is to a) build trust and support among the community and b) win over the intellectuals and the students. New Right looks forward to the day when nationalists can use the same tactics, with similar success, as the NPD here in Australia (although success is never guaranteed in any endeavour).

New Right believes that power can be won – if it can be won – by a series of sustained ‘shocks’ to the liberal democratic system. In other words, a ‘state of exception’ (to use Carl Schmitt’s phrase) needs to be created in Australia, a disruption of the day to day constitutional functions of the Australian State, when the constitution itself becomes in temporary abeyance (as, for instance, during the period of the sacking of the Whitlam government in 1975). It is only during that disruption – which will break up the normal order of things – that Australian nationalists can go ahead and ‘seize power’.

So how will those ‘shocks’ be brought about? Those shocks need to be induced practically (at the street level); intellectually; and emotionally. At the street level, there needs to be a political confrontation, carried out publicly (and with maximum media publicity) against the Left, who, more than any other group, seek to oppose nationalists’ presence on the street. Intellectually, nationalist intellectuals need to make the case to the public that the liberal democratic system is not working, has not worked, and never will, to make them stop believing in the worthwhileness of the liberal parliamentarian system. Emotionally, nationalist propagandists need to induce a state of permanent emotional agitation in the general public, through media and propaganda organs (Internet radio, party newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, posters, stickers, fliers, home-produced DVDs). Such propaganda aims at keeping the public’s nerves permanently on edge, and directing public animosity against the enemies of nationalism.

These are the same techniques as those used by the German National Socialists and the Italian Fascists in the 1920s and the 1930s, and by the British National Front in the 1970s. It is the New Right’s belief that they can be used, successfully, in Australia. They are means, not ends in themselves, and the end is, in the long-term, the successful ‘seizure of power’.
This concludes our statement on National-Anarchism and Australian nationalism. Hopefully, it has cleared up any confusion which has arisen among nationalists as to New Right’s aims and methods.

It should be noted that this document, of course, is not ‘legally binding’ on all members: to be a member of New Right, one does not have to agree with every word. We do not seek a communist party system where a party-line is imposed on every member, whether they agree with it or not, from the top down. (Indeed, it could be said that the ideas of the New Right come from the bottom up).

The New Right Australia New Zealand accepts many nationalist and other political and social activists of many different shades of political ideology and beliefs as long as they are willing to work together on today’s problems and issues that concern our society.

It is inclusive, not exclusive.

'Tradition and Revolution: Collected Writings of Troy Southgate'
Aarhus: Integral Traditions (2007), 329 pp.

Reviewed by Andreas Faust

This book contains a varied selection of essays, poems, and other short written pieces by Troy Southgate, one of the founders of the philosophy known as National-Anarchism. National-Anarchism is a cultural current rather than an organisation. It is a long-term strategy. N-A developed simultaneously in England, France and Germany, in just the same way that modern Odinism simultaneously sprang up in at least four different countries in the early 1970s.
N-A is a form of anarchism which has no roots in the political left, but neither is it right-wing. It differs from the 'mainstream' anarchist movement in its support for racial separatism (amongst other things), but at the same time has no problem with those who want to establish mixed-race communities also. As Southgate puts it: "We have no desire to rule over an administrative structure or disaffected population of any kind [...] Whilst they choose their own destinies, we shall choose ours."

If N-A took off on a wide scale, this would theoretically lead to a series of independent communities, which "may or may not wish to form part of a confederated alliance". Each community, of course, would be primed for self-defence. The regional alliance or federation would support any group of individuals wishing to found a separate community to preserve their own identity – regardless of what that identity might be.

So, has the book converted this reviewer to National-Anarchism? Well, hmmm, hmmm...I believe it might have. I still dislike the term. But on the other hand I can't really think of a better one. On explaining the concept to a friend recently, he pointed out that as soon as you start throwing the word 'anarchist' about, it will automatically turn people away. The word has become linked with images of violence, chaos, disorder...sinister men in black balaclavas throwing bombs.

But who exactly should the term appeal to? The conservatively inclined probably wouldn't support the doctrine anyway, even if wrapped in more soothing packaging. The term 'National-Anarchist', on the other hand, is likely to appeal to the young and rebellious, whose minds might not as yet be stultified. And as Tord Morsund notes in his introduction, N-A is not chaotic at all, but is a strategy that starts with the individual, then progresses to the family, the community, village, town etc. There is a need to reclaim the term 'anarchy', which N-A is certainly contributing towards doing.

The 'black bloc' left-wing anarchists seen spray-painting walls at many an anti-globalist demo probably wouldn't know what to do if the State ever collapsed, as they claim they wish to happen. But N-A is already planning for such eventualities. And N-A has the added benefit of confusing people's political preconceptions by mixing up 'left-' and 'right-wing' symbolism, thus forcing people to step outside their preconceived thought patterns (which only serve the globalist agenda).

The first essay in the book, 'Transcending the Beyond', is as close to an N-A 'mission statement' as there is. N-A originally emerged from a movement called the 'International Third Position', which rightly recognised that communism was not an antidote to capitalism but actually a "symptom and product" of it. But while these 'third positionists' were committed to going beyond the 'two C's (capitalism and communism), "National-Anarchists have taken things one step further by actually transcending the very notion of beyond." In other words, they have rejected the concept of the State itself, aiming towards 'independent enclaves'. They have maintained a belief in racial separatism but no longer want to impose that belief on others. So N-A is to political theory, then, what heathenism is to religion.

People like Southgate have been described by some fanatical leftists as 'fascists', but even a cursory glance at their ideas will show this to be untrue. Southgate regards the fascist regimes in general as having been 'reactionary charlatans' who used nationalism as a cloak to disguise their sympathy for international capital. He does see value in certain 'fascist' groups, like the Romanian Iron Guard (who he believes were genuine nationalists, not reactionaries). The Iron Guard's 'nest' system of organisation and its lack of authoritarian hierarchy (leadership had to be earned, leaders benevolent and cheerful, not gloomy, and willing to sacrifice themselves along with their men) all give it common ground with National-Anarchism.

N-A itself achieves the difficult feat of being both non-authoritarian and meritocratic. Meritocratic because it encourages greatness to rise to the top...unlike capitalism, which elevates a pseudo-aristocracy based on greed, ensuring many worthy people are unable to rise to their natural level. But also non-authoritarian in the sense that it doesn't seek power over those who don't share its vision...which would be throwing pearls before swine in any case. N-A communities would also have little need for internal policing...Southgate quotes John Pfeiffer to the extent that an "organic society has no need for policing practices until the population has exceeded more than 500 persons. This is because 500 is considered to be the maximum number of people that one person could possibly know." (my italics)

What is the relation of N-A to nationalism, then? Southgate originally called himself a 'Revolutionary Nationalist' (or 'Social Nationalist'), and nationalism itself, as he often states, is beyond left and right (contrary to the media claim that it's 'right-wing'). It could fairly be said, then, that N-A is an updated form of nationalism, one better suited to the practical situation that nationalists in the modern world face. He illustrates this by a quote from Roger Bacon: "He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils."

But while this may be well and good in Europe or North America, what about Australia or New Zealand...thinly populated lands ripe for the taking by two populous empires directly to the north (Indonesia and China), as soon as the American ally's power declines. Would N-A perhaps have a negative effect in Australasia, weakening our capacity for self defence? The main Australasian exponent of N-A is Welf Herfurth, resident in Sydney. Herfurth's idea, as formulated in a recent interview, seems to be that Australia should consist of a patchwork quilt of different communities, all completely independent, but co-operating in the important matter of foreign policy. So these entities would not be completely independent, but would constitute a kind of bloc or casual federation.

That don't sound so bad...although there is another issue there should also be consensus on – the environment. Cultural independence won't do us any good if there isn't any land to be inhabited, all being soil-degraded or flooded. Overpopulation, of course, has much to do with this, and Southgate himself is pessimistic. He thinks there is nothing we can realistically do to check overpopulation, and that nature herself will eventually take care of the matter, possibly via a plague or sequence of natural disasters. All that's left to do, he believes, is to harden ourselves to this fact, and to concentrate on preserving those lives that can be preserved (i.e. those who have the will to survive).

What kind of practical strategies does Southgate propose for promoting N-A ideals? One tactic he advocates is 'entryism'...we should not fight the enemy head-on, but from within. This can only occur when there are more National-Anarchists than now. But yes, it is more effective than using the ballot-box. That is how the leftists managed to take over the univerisities in their so-called 'long march through the institutions'. Open warfare against the State is impossible at this point in time, so entryism may be the best course to pursue. But hand in hand with that, of course, goes the cultural struggle. That is where N-A intersects with the broader and less dogmatic current known as the European New Right.

Like the ENR, Southgate believes that political objectives "must be preceded by a Spiritual Revolution". We must build from the inside, not the other way around. In line with this, he advocates home-schooling (which he practises in his own family) as one of the best ways of ensuring our traditions are passed on. Southgate demolishes many myths, such as the one that home-schooled children will be 'sheltered' or 'socially naive'...in fact they have better social skills and are shown to be more socially adjusted. They can always join a local sports team or organisation to mix with other kids.

Home-schooled kids are usually better educated than those taught in schools, and have often reached university level by age fourteen. I remember reading an article in the local paper that confirmed this. There's a time investment, but teaching materials are not very expensive. The next step would be to establish 'practical learning centres', where home-school parents can help each other with resources and so forth. On the other hand, the system may crack down on this in future...home-schooling was recently outlawed in California, and as everyone knows, when California sneezes the world catches a cold.

There will also presumably be the need to form vigilante groups, for protection. The existing communities will thank us for this, while the more sensible 'official' cops may come to turn a blind eye to it. Troy rightly emphasises the importance of self-defence and fitness skills. But is it enough? The State may use military force against us at a certain point. On the other hand, the State's promotion of multi-racialism may in turn work against it, as common identities take form out of the increasing chaos. None of us can really say what the future holds...all we can do is to take an idea and try to make it work. N-A is as good an idea as any I've heard.

As a kind of added bonus, the book contains Southgate's chapter-by-chapter analysis of Julius Evola's book Men Among the Ruins, which will be of benefit to those wish to understand the key concepts of Evola's political thought but can't abide Evola's constipated writing style. The book also contains two fascinating esoteric essays. One is called 'A Sussex Swan: the Wodenic Mysteries of a Small English Town,' and concerns a town named Steyning, full of symbolism relating to the constellation of Cygnus the Swan, which Troy believes is at the centre of an English spiritual revival. May the ugly ducklings of our modern towns and cities find their true destiny as swans! As black swans here in the South, of course...

Beachy Head, another Sussex locality, forms an exact contrast to Steyning...as England's most popular suicide spot, it has lured countless people to literally 'drop out' of life. But often those people are amongst the most gifted (and consequently don't fit in with the modern world). Thus Beachy Head is depriving us of future artists and leaders. Southgate maintains that "something quite cataclysmic is taking place beyond the gaze of the ordinary masses." He suggests we can counteract this by "re-energising the more authentic points which concord with our spiritual and psychological heritage," and thus to "raise the banner of the Northern Sun against the lunar-centred darkness that envelopes our land."

If you don't believe such a lunar-centred darkness exists, just step around the corner. Welcome to a world where "teenage mothers...old before their time and flanked by hooped earrings and a pink mobile phone," with "no education" and "no future" rub shoulders with "wealthy businessmen with piggy eyes and sweaty palms," in a town where "graffiti is scrawled on any available space" and where "imagination and creativity are pushed aside."

Southgate's book aims at countering all this. It is intended for both "present and future generations." It will become a valuable point of reference for the emerging National-Anarchist movement. As the quote at the start of the book says, "the new man is still evolving." He comes "from the quiet periphery," but around him "the coming world will henceforth order itself." Troy maintains that N-A is "the next logical step towards the raising of mankind's spiritual and intellectual consciousness." In short, it is "an idea whose time has come." Let us hope, then, that it proves more powerful than the proverbial marching army.

The book can be ordered from Integral Tradition (see http://www.integraltradition.com/catalog/about.php)

RUSSIA IN 2008: THOUGHTS ON HEGELIAN GEOPOLITICS

by Troy Southgate

Despite the negative image of Russia that is currently being portrayed in the media, it seems pretty feasible that Putin - possibly since his last meeting with Bush in 2007 - was eventually persuaded, albeit covertly, to capitulate to Western demands. That he's a loyal friend of Russia's capitalist ruling class is not even up for debate, even if some people in Right-wing circles do seem to respect him for ousting the Jewish oligarchs several years ago. In reality, however, Russian capitalism is no better than its Jewish-dominated counterpart and Putin's so-called 'successor', Dmitry Medvedev, is little more than a puppet of the same socio-economic regime. But when you stop to think about the vilification of Russia over the last few months, especially with the well-publicised Litvinenko affair, the systematic construction of what many people are interpreting as a 'new Cold War' is, in a sense, rather Hegelian. The reason being, that contradiction, of course, eventually leads to reconciliation and some commentators believe that the thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula is better expressed in the dictum: 'problem-alternative-solution'. Perhaps this potential return to a bi-polar world is a shift beyond Samuel Huntingdon's 'Clash of Civilisations' strategy in which there is merely one superpower (United States) fighting against an imagined or manufactured opponent (Islam)? Let's think seriously for a moment about the relationship between the West and Russia in both a Hegelian (after Fichte) and a geopolitical context:

* thesis or intellectual proposition (Western capitalism)
* antithesis or negation of the proposition (Soviet communism)
* synthesis or reconciliation (a gradual alliance, through perestroika, between the two)
* presentation of a new antithesis (Cold War 2, Russia as the 'new' bogeyman)

... and so it goes on ...

Russia has not exactly presented a new antithesis in an ideological sense as Soviet Communism claimed to do, of course, and it was Hegel's view that no new antithesis can ever arise due to the eventual disappearance of extreme ideological and philosophical positions, but this rather idealistic perspective does not seem to take into consideration the fact that convenience will often outweigh genuine revolutionary fervour. It remains to be seen where Islam will fit into all this.

Food for thought.

NOTES ON LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS ALTERNATIVE

by John Gordon

The political regime under which much of the world labours (and the entire Western world) is called “Liberal Democracy.” Francis Fukuyama has praised the ever widening expansion of this regime over the globe as “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and [it consists in] the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”[i] The source of Fukuyama’s thesis, the Russian Hegelian Marxist, Alexandre Kojève, called this End State the “universal and homogeneous state”: it is the ultimate goal of both Liberalism and Communism.

We often refer to our system of Liberal Democracy simply as “democracy” and use it as our undisputed standard with which to judge the political arrangements both of ourselves and other countries (“But that’s undemocratic!” is often heard in political debates to settle any issue under discussion, as if there were no legitimate regimes besides democracy). Its mere mention is enough to anaesthetise lingering doubts about the justice of our system of government and the fairness of its delivery of “outcomes.” “Democracy” is however a term which is equivocal, having more than one meaning, and Liberal Democracy – the system which promotes the bourgeois, capitalism, and now globalisation, is not the only type of democracy nor even the only type of legitimate government. Inasmuch as Liberal Democracy is the system which has (intentionally) caused and ensures the continuance of our present problems of neo-liberal capitalism, individualism, and (latterly) globalisation and its accompanying universalistic suppression of the particular ethnic diversity of nations and exploitation of workers (wherever possible), it is in our interest not only to critique it, but also to look for alternatives to replace it.

What has obscured the fact that there are other legitimate forms of government and even of democracy than what is presently put forward as the only possible one is that the predominant political regimes of the last 100 years or so have been Statist in nature, namely: Liberal Democracy, Communism, and Fascism, and that out of these, Liberal Democracy became the “last man standing” by the beginning of the last decade of the previous century with the fall of Soviet Communism. Liberal Democracy has also had the good fortune to be the best of these Statist alternatives (merely in a strictly comparative sense), so that while Bolshevik Communism was presenting itself as the wave of the future the lesser of the two evils was certainly Liberal Democracy. However, the fall of Communism now allows us to re-examine our own system of government without the charge being laid against us that we are enemy agents working on behalf of a foreign power, nor that what we want for our own country is manifestly worse than what is being presently provided for us.

Nor should we meekly accept the commands of others on what we can or cannot find objectionable, just because the Left thinks that it has a monopoly on political issues. Graham D. Macklin’s reactionary defence of leftist only criticisms of Liberalism, Capitalism, and Globalisation is a typical reaction of the Traditional Left when it is outgunned on what it considers its own turf. His desperate plea for such groups as “ecological subcultures” to remain limited or fully-committed only to critiques of the means to achieving the “universal and homogeneous state” show that the left establishment is intellectually powerless against the more consistent and thorough-going criticisms of those who reject both the means to the end and the end itself of Globalisation. Further, his article is premised on an unreflective and unargued charge of “racism” (left undefined) amounting to the political demand that acquiescence or indifference to injustice and exploitation – if it is whites who are the ones who are being suppressed – is the only course possible and that such injustice and exploitation need not concern us nor should that injustice be the basis of corrective political action. Macklin here plays the part of Christ in the New Testament in his political insistence not to resist evil, but without the accompanying divine promises of Redemption and Retribution that underwrite Christ’s command. Yet, Macklin remains unaware that his position is not at all persuasive. Criticism of Globalisation – its causes and inherent features – is not the privileged prerogative of self-appointed spokesmen on the Left. In fact, it is more important for those who oppose Globalisation in toto to speak out against it and to organise activism against the injustices that necessarily – and not accidentally – follow in its wake.

With regards to the most notable feature of Statist political regimes – the separation of State and Society – which all Statist political regimes embody, it is neither the only possible political arrangement nor the only legitimate one. The political writings of the German legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, can be of use in formulating how and why this is so.[ii]

Despite Liberal Democracy being conflated into the single term, “democracy,” Carl Schmitt insists that “Both, liberalism and democracy, have to be distinguished from one another…” since “[t]he belief in parliamentarism, in government by discussion [i.e., by one of the two distinguishing features of Liberal Democracy, the other being “openness”], belongs to the intellectual world of liberalism,” and it “does not belong to democracy.”[iii] In other words, two separate ideas are combined in Liberal Democracy which are in tension with each other. Further, the Liberal element in Liberal Democracy takes precedence over or supersedes its democratic element: this is what causes “the crisis of Liberal Democracy,” viz. its lack of legitimacy and reliance on legality (or force) alone: it brooks no fundamental opposition.

So, if – according to Carl Schmitt – Liberal Democracy is characterised by government by “discussion” and by “openness,” what are the defining characteristics of non-liberal Democracy? It is that of an identity of the ruled and ruling, where there is a shared common good – achievable through homogeneity of the populace.[iv] Parliament (the cornerstone of Liberal Democracy) impedes the common good, i.e. the identity of the ruling and ruled, by relying on 50% + 1 votes (always ensuring that there is rule of a majority over a minority). This leads to the separation of the political rulers from the constituency that they are meant to represent and the creation of an impersonal system of bureaucratic rule indifferent to the content or interests of the society over which it presides.

Party rule predominates – where representatives of the people rule and the people themselves do not rule nor do they rule in turn. Thus, “parliamentarism has become an object of spoils and compromise for the parties and their followers, and politics, far from being the concern of an elite, has become the despised business of a rather dubious class of persons.”[v] Who does not immediately recognise the character of Australian politics here summed up both presently and indeed since Federation? And Schmitt’s holding to account the Liberal Democratic cheer-squad of the 19th century rings just as true now as then: “It is like a satire if one quotes Bentham today: ‘In Parliament ideas meet, and contact between ideas gives off sparks and leads to evidence’.”[vi] A perusal of Hansard or the televised sessions of Parliament Question Time emphatically confirms Schmitt’s assessment. And the entire reason for the rotten edifice in the first place is brought undone by considering its own claim to legitimacy: “Where is there any kind of certainty that the possessors of particles of reason are to be found precisely in parliament?”[vii] The suggestion only has to be articulated to be revealed as absurd. And “[if in reality] in the actual circumstances of parliamentary business, openness and discussion here become an empty and trivial formality, then parliament, as it developed in the nineteenth century, has also lost its previous foundation and meaning.”[viii] And so, the arguments originally used to found, support and defend Liberal Democracy are irredeemably obsolete: “Burke, Bentham, Guizot, and John Stuart Mill are thus antiquated today.”[ix]

However, there is yet a further equivocacy with the term “Democracy,” related to the long history that this word has. This is revealed when Carl Schmitt asserts, “Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally.”[x] The source cited for this statement is supplied by the editor of this book by Schmitt, Ellen Kennedy, is Aristotle’s Politics, 1280a (using the standard reference of the Bekker edition’s page and column number). We will compare Carl Schmitt and Aristotle on this point in a moment.

The conclusion Schmitt derives for this principle of treating equals equally and unequals unequally is that “Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second – if the need arises – elimination or eradication of heterogeneity.” “A democracy demonstrates its political power by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign and unequal that threatens its homogeneity.”[xi] Universal equality detracts from politics and obliterates true differences: “Equality is only interesting and valuable politically so long as it has substance, and for that reason at least the possibility and the risk of inequality.”[xii]
The term used by Carl Schmitt to oppose Liberal Democracy is democracy (without the attached ‘liberal’ qualification). The reference to Aristotle’s Politics which links this term to the notion of treating equal things equally and unequal things unequally shows that Schmitt has in mind the type of regime called by Aristotle – not “democracy,” but – politeia, the general term for any type of regime or form of government. Politeia gets translated by Latin authors as res publica, which has as its descendant our English word “republic.” A politeia in the sense of a specific type of regime (rather than as a term for regimes generally) is a mixed regime, using the principles of both democracy (viz. equality) and oligarchy (viz. inequality).

Is there anything to be said for Liberal Democracy? A final, rearguard support for Liberal Democracy which is neither unreflective nor oblivious to modern liberalism’s inherent theoretical and practical failings has in fact been put forward by Leo Strauss: “… liberal democracy, in contradistinction to communism and fascism, derives powerful support from a way of thinking which cannot be called modern at all: the pre-modern thought of our western tradition.”[xiii]

Liberal Democracy could be based on two different understandings of liberalism:
1. Modern liberalism (the type we call “Democracy” or Liberal Democracy),
or
2. Ancient liberalism (the “pre-modern thought of our western tradition,” viz. Plato and Aristotle, in particular).

Recall that Schmitt used the pre-modern understanding of “democracy” to draw a useful distinction to critique modern Liberal Democracy. This pre-modern understanding of “democracy” is equivalent to option number 2, the variety of ancient liberalism.

Strauss provides a handy summary of this development of modern thought by use of a “poetic analogy” which helps us visualise the successive innovations which led to the foundation of Liberalism and Liberal Democracy in the first place: that of the “Three Waves of Modernity.” The main regime types we see or have seen and are aware of in the world today (or in the recent past) have all had philosophic founders. These founders emerged in a sequence and relied on earlier developments upon which the further articulation of their own positions was founded, while having a beginning and source which presented itself as a revolt from the thought of the past. This provides us with the following schema:
First Wave: the repudiation of pre-modern political thought (both Classical and Biblical) by Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke: this culminates in the foundation of Liberalism, and capitalism (the advocacy for a “commercial society” –cf. Adam Smith).[xiv]
Second Wave: J.-J. Rousseau’s critique and adaptation of the First Wave. Kant, Hegel and Marx (and therefore Communism) find their basis here.
Third Wave: Friedrich Nietzsche and his successors.

According to Strauss, “The theory of liberal democracy, as well as of communism, originated in the first and second waves of modernity; the political implication of the Third wave proved to be fascism.”[xv]

If it is true that modern thought arose as a break with the past (in the “first wave of modernity” and on which the subsequent “waves” also depend as their own foundation) in full awareness of what it was doing (as Strauss asserts was in fact the case) it is hard to see how pre-modern thought could be somehow incorporated into the modern thought represented by Liberalism or how that modern thought could draw support on the very past with which it consciously broke and repudiated.

In another work, Liberalism, Ancient and Modern, Strauss repeats and amplifies some of these contentions. While still claiming that “There is a direct connection between the notion of the mixed regime and modern republicanism [i.e. Liberal Democracy],”[xvi] and that there are two senses of the term “liberal,” he now provides what the content of these different conceptions is. The original, pre-modern sense of being liberal is displaying the virtue of liberality where “the genuinely liberal man is identical with the genuinely virtuous man,” and in contrast the modern sense of liberal as that which underlies contemporary Liberal Democracy: negative freedom, in the Isaiah Berlin sense, i.e. a freedom from something, not a freedom for anything.[xvii] This is confirmed by the original form of liberalism being opposed to the very end posited by modern Liberalism and Communism: “…classical political philosophy [viz. that of Plato and Aristotle in particular] opposes to the universal and homogeneous state [i.e. the goal of both Liberalism and Communism] a substantive principle. It asserts that the society natural to man is the city, that is, a closed society that can well be taken in in one view or that corresponds to man’s natural (macroscopic, not microscopic or telescopic) power of perception.”[xviii] The “city” here is the Greek polis, which does not separate State and Society like modern Statist regimes, such as Liberal Democracy, et al. By being a closed society, it protects and favours its own, and is opposed to universalism which threatens both its ethnic identity or particularity and its homogeneity.

On the basis of this closed society which antedates the distinction between State and Society concomitant with Liberal Democracy, the political thinkers of classical antiquity favoured the following solution to the political problem: “For all practical purposes they were satisfied with a regime in which the gentlemen share power with the people in such a way that the people elect the magistrates and the council from among the gentlemen and demand an account of them at the end of their term of office. A variation of this thought is the notion of the mixed regime, in which the gentlemen form the senate and the senate occupies the key position between the popular assembly and an elected or hereditary monarch as head of the armed forces of society.”[xix]

The Athenian Democracy of the 4th Century BC, though not fully embodying the combination of equality and inequality as recommended by Aristotle that could have stabilised its political history, certainly overcame the separation of State and Society, and thereby the symptoms of political and civic alienation and degradation and withdrawal which we experience and witness in our own societies today. The political and social interaction of the average citizen is quite extraordinary for us to behold: “Historians have often described the wide array of institutions in which the Athenian democrat took part and the intense civic experience it produced. By 400 BCE, property qualifications for citizenship had been eliminated; the principal legislative body was the Assembly of all citizens; the boards of lawmakers (nomothetai) and the juries were chosen by lot from the citizens; the Council, which prepared the agenda for the Assembly was chosen annually by lot from the citizenry; the decisions of the Assembly were subject to review only by the people’s courts. Citizens not only deliberated and took decisions in the Assembly, Council, and the courts, but they chose leaders, made decisions about foreign policy and war, judged the credentials of officeholders, issued decrees, and much more. To this should be added the flourishing local political cultures centered in the demes.”[xx]

The problem now is: How to obtain a viable modern equivalent to the ancient achievement of republican government in the small, closed society which does not separate State and Society, and is neither Statist nor Liberal Democratic.

Bibliography

Caton, Hiram. 1988. The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600-1835. Gainesville. University of Florida Press.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer): 2-18.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York. Free Press.
Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John, and Madison, James. 1937. The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, ed. Edward Mead Earle. New York: Modern Library Edition.
Kojève, Alexandre. 1968. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. (Ed. Allan Bloom, Trans. James H. Nichols, Jr.) Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press.
Macklin, Graham D. 2005. “Co-opting the Counter-Culture: Troy Southgate and the National Revolutionary Faction,” in Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 39, no. 3, 301-26.
Schmitt, Carl. 1923. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. (Trans. Ellen Kennedy). Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1985.
Schmitt, Carl. 1932. The Concept of the Political. (Trans. George Schwab). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Strauss, Leo. 1968. Liberal Ancient and Modern. New York. Basic Books.
Strauss, Leo. 1975. “The Three Waves of Modernity,” in An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays. Indianapolis and New York. Bobbs Merrill/Pegasus.
Wolin, Sheldon S., 1993, “Democracy: Electoral and Athenian,” in PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3. (Sep.), 475-477.[i] Fukuyama (1989) 271.[ii] Even though Carl Schmitt is compromised by his later opportunistic submission to Statist Fascism, this need not retro-spectively invalidate his analysis – at least for those of us who wish to avoid the charge of committing the logical fallacy of argumentum ad hominem.[iii] Schmitt (1923) 8-9.[iv] Ibid. 15.[v] Ibid. 4.[vi] Ibid. 7.[vii] Ibid. 35.[viii] Ibid. 50.[ix] Ibid. 7.[x] Ibid. 9.[xi] Ibid.[xii] Ibid.[xiii] Strauss (1975) 98.[xiv] Cf. Caton, Hiram (1988). The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600-1835. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.[xv] Strauss (1975) 98.[xvi] Strauss (1968) 15.[xvii] Ibid. ix.[xviii] Ibid. x.[xix] Ibid. 15.[xx] Wolin (1993) 477.